3 documentation generated by Star Chamber-its bills of complaint, responses, and depositions-is unusually rich in detailing women's interactions with law. In deploying these records, this article explores the extent to which women were able to capitalize on the legal opportunities offered by early Tudor Star Chamber. It begins by assessing the quantitative data to provide a context for female participation as plaintiffs and defendants, yet it also shows the problems in relying on these statistics for understanding the scale of women's legal involvement. Through a qualitative study of cases from across England and Wales, it considers the factors that may have determined whether, and in what circumstances, women appeared as plaintiffs, the strategies that may have underpinned decisions on how to structure litigation, and what can be inferred about women's capacities to negotiate the system. "Star Chamber" originally referred simply to the regular meeting place used by the King's Council at Westminster to conduct its administrative and judicial business. It was not until the early sixteenth century that it became a separate court of the realm, and mainly during Thomas Wolsey's chancellorship (December 1515-October 1529) that its judicial function was advanced, areas of jurisdiction were defined, and procedures were formalized.
As subjects could in theory petition the king and his council on any grievance, Star Chamber in this period had a broad jurisdiction, dealing with both civil and criminal business. Its main subject of litigation was real property, but it also dealt with offences including breaches of the peace (such as riot, assault, trespass) and the perversion of justice (such as perjury or maintenance, and the misdemeanors of crown officials), alongside a range of miscellaneous cases. Some of these issues, like fraud, forgery, and perjury, were ones not adequately dealt with in common law courts, and, like Chancery, Star Chamber was a court to which plaintiffs Wales, ed. Simone Clarke and Michael Roberts (Cardiff, 2000) , 50−74. 4 turned to circumvent the limitations of common law. 5 As a prerogative court, it was less formulaic and more flexible than common law courts and could be appealed to for help when other remedies had failed. Thus a significant proportion of Star Chamber bills concerned cases that had already been brought or were pending in other central or local courts. 6 It is a useful source, therefore, to examine women negotiating multiple jurisdictions.
Women and Gender in Early Modern
The court primarily operated for the benefit of private litigants and dealt with cases between two parties. A private suit was usually entered by filing a bill of complaint according to a particular form. It was composed with the advice of counsel, written in English, engrossed on parchment by professional scribes, signed by the plaintiff's counsel, and filed by a clerk. Should the case proceed beyond the bill stage, there would be a defendant's answer, and sometimes the plaintiff's replication and the defendant's rejoinder (all of which comprised the pleadings), followed by interrogations and depositions (the proofs). 7 This process offers some advantages for the modern researcher. The documentation was composed from the perspective of the litigant and not the court; written interrogatories and depositions, which increasingly included those of the defendants, provide valuable details; and the narrative form and use of English in the pleadings offer the potential for "individualizing features." 8 Nevertheless, historians are conscious of the temptation to see these documents as 5 Guy, Cardinal's Court, 52−53.
6 John H. Baker, The Oxford History of the Law of England, vol. 6, 1483 -1558 (Oxford, 2003 , 118. Goddisland had apparently scuppered a potential marriage arrangement by telling her intended that Alice was a "besy woman of her tong and she ys full of lawe & she doth put one to moch besynes." 53 In a similar vein, Richard Golborne's response to Alice Moreton's complaint was to describe her as a "veray trobelous and besy woman" whose sole pleasure was to trouble and vex the said defendant. 54 This is not to argue that male litigants were immune to criticisms of licentiousness, but that women's susceptibility to such accusationsespecially given the widespread belief that women should be under the guidance of menmore directly influenced the framing of their bills and responses.
In this context of limited legal authority, female litigants and their counsel made strategic decisions about which court to petition and how to present their case, including whom to name as plaintiff(s). One determining factor appears to be the type of suit brought. 
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Female plaintiffs went to court over the same range of issues as men, if not on the same scale; nevertheless, it is possible to find suits where the female voice was considered more powerful, although it was heavily circumscribed. According to common law, a woman could prosecute in an appeal involving the murder of her husband: it was she who provided the narration of the events and identified the perpetrators. 55 Indeed, legally and culturally, there appears to have been an expectation, an obligation even, that widows would be the ones to prosecute the death of a husband rather than another member of his kin. In early Star
Chamber records, thirty widows brought bills of complaint as sole plaintiffs in cases relating to the murder of their husbands. 56 The narrative detail recounted in each petition describes the events leading up to the murder and the kill shot or blow. On occasion the widow was with her husband when the attack happened and hence would have direct knowledge of the murder, 57 yet in the majority of cases wives were nowhere near when the fatal wounding occurred. The bill's narrative therefore drew on a range of information the woman and her legal counsel must have learnt subsequently from witnesses, friends, and potentially the coroner's account. There had been time to do so because in many instances the widow was not petitioning for an individual to be charged, as that had already occurred in a common law court, but for the guilty party to be properly punished. The widow's responsibility to seek full justice for her husband meant negotiating multiple jurisdictions.
55 Barbara A. Hanawalt, "Of Good and Ill Repute": Gender and Social Control in Medieval England (Oxford, 1998) Dunn has pointed out, when a woman was abducted, it jeopardized the properties she held for 58 The verbs most regularly used in these cases are "to ravish" and "to take away." The majority of cases in Star Chamber relate to abduction, often with the intention of forced marriage, although sexual assault is likely in several cases. her present (or future) husband and children or other heirs. As such, the rights of male relatives to "claim the status of injured party" were increasingly upheld by the courts in the later Middle Ages. 62 Where women most regularly appeared as plaintiffs in bills alleging abduction, it was as co-litigants alongside their husbands and mainly where the victim was a female relative (often daughter, sometimes sister). It is also noteworthy that the five single female plaintiffs mentioned above were not pursuing an appeal of rape (as they might do at common law) but for ancillary problems, including the failure of local justices in lower courts to deal with their cases. In Typlary's bill, the emphasis was not on the details of the attempted rape-which were provided-but on the broken leg she sustained as she was attacked. This had left her, a girl in service, "not able to labor for leving" who thus would be forced to beg.
The evidence from Star Chamber, therefore, supports the view that male relatives rather than Chamber against Henry Vernon, knight, the latter countered that Margaret was married to
Roger Vernon, not named in the bill, and therefore the suit should "abate." 63 Similarly, in response to a complaint by Alice Tapton, the defendants pointed out that she was covert de baron with one William Tapton, who was not named in the bill, and hence they did not need to provide an answer.
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Nevertheless, in both cases the defendants' responses continued to list other reasons why the plaintiffs' bills were wrong, a recognition that they realized a missing husband's name did not in itself amount to a sufficient rebuttal. Recent research on coverture has questioned the strict use of the doctrine in a number of jurisdictions and shown that its application depended both on the specific court and the litigants themselves; experience often varied from spouse to spouse. 65 Star Chamber suits can show the variety in approaches.
Wives rarely appear as litigants, for example, when the offence was a violent attack on their person. In many cases this seems to be because a wife's assault was merely one of a series of wrongdoings committed against a household's property and goods, but the pattern is not 66 While the vast majority of suits featuring assaults on wives were brought by husbands alone, in a small number of cases the wife appears as a co-litigant. There is no obvious pattern, although one possibility is that the wife was named in those cases where the husband was not an eyewitness: for example, where a wife was alone when attacked and so
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alongside their husbands, which shows that they were considered two persons in the court of Star Chamber. 67 Moreover, as the case of Agnes Tapton indicates, married women could be not only co-litigants but sole plaintiffs. Wives can be found acting on behalf of their spouses when the latter were absent for some reason: this may have been because the husband was not of sound mind, 68 because a wife was pleading for safe-conduct to be granted to her husband, 69 or because he had been imprisoned. 70 In these instances she acted as her husband's deputy:
these responsibilities fell within her role as householder and she would be expected to draw on the legal knowledge she had gained through that lived experience.
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The court also allowed some wives to sue their husbands, and they did so usually on the grounds that their position as wife was not being honored. This was often when traumatized by the assault that she had lost her "perfytt wytt and reason." TNA, STAC 2/13, fol. 241.
absenteeism had become more permanent, there was abusive spousal behavior, or where lands, goods, and maintenance, which she should legally use and enjoy, were being denied to her. In these examples, we see both an acceptance that a woman retained claims over property she brought to a marriage and that the husband had a legal duty to support and protect his wife. 72 For example, Anne Banester complained that she had been married legally to her husband, John, for over ten years, yet without any obvious cause he had "absented"
himself from her company. He had refused to provide any allowance and taken all the profits from her inheritance; she and her child were solely reliant on their friends for subsistence.
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Similarly, Agnes Wildecote alleged that her husband had taken for himself the yearly profits of both the lands she had brought to the marriage and the jointure bestowed upon them; he had also deprived her of meat, drink, and clothing so that she was thrown into extreme poverty. 74 Other examples of the misuse of inheritance and dower/jointure were accompanied with accusations of domestic abuse. Hence Kathryn Rocheford accused her husband, John
These, and similar suits, clearly overlap with the jurisdiction of the church courts, and a few Star Chamber plaintiffs had pursued actions in those courts prior to petitioning the king. Yet their strategy in Star Chamber was different. Whereas in the ecclesiastical courts, accounts of unreasonable behavior were central to cases of separation, especially those claiming cruelty or coercion, in Star Chamber they were intended to build a character sketch that validated bringing the case to its judges. Nor were the women pleading for violent trespass against their husbands, but instead were attempting to reinforce a contract or reclaim the loss of their property. As such, Star Chamber acted as a mechanism to prevent husbands abusing their control over their wives' properties.
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In the cases discussed above, spousal relations had broken down. However, married women did not go to the law as sole plaintiffs only when their husbands were incapacitated or had left them. Other considerations beyond strict legal necessities were weighed up when individuals and their counsel decided whom to name as co-litigant. As Stretton has shown, wives occasionally appeared as co-litigants in actions that, legally, did not involve their property or rights, and the involvement of husbands and wives in each other's legal affairs was frequently assumed. 78 Yet this flexibility also meant that it was legally possible for wives to go to Star Chamber without their husbands explicitly being named as co-litigants. While this can be demonstrated conclusively in only a handful of cases, they again provide supporting evidence of the cultural acceptance that title to real property brought to a marriage by the woman would remain attached to her. In the late 1520s, for example, Anne Llewellyn Chamber. In this bill, Anne was the sole orator, but in a set of documents relating to the case she was named alongside her husband, John Llewellyn. Anne was evidently married when the Star Chamber bill was created (she shares his surname), and she was not described as a widow. More strikingly, the supporting documentation indicates that Anne had acted on behalf of her and her husband when she laid down her demands:
At whiche day [13 November 1527] Anne Llewellyn for hyr self & for hir husbande, complaynauntes, and Watkyn Vaughan, defendant, appered at Beaudeley biffore the pryncesse counsaill 79 wheare these books were seen and red. And forasmoche as the said Anne refuseth to appere agayne at any further day affore this counsaill to be ordered in this matter, but maketh sute and peticion to have these books to her deliyvered to seche hir further remedye hereyn, therefore it is ordred that the said Anne have to her delivered all these books annexed together.
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The items were then detailed and delivered to both Anne and the defendant. The lands in question were those inherited by Anne from her father, and it is evident that even when the documentation recorded the plaintiffs as John Llewellyn and Anne, his wife, it was the latter who was recognized as the decision-maker. There is no sense that Anne needed her husband's physical presence in the actual proceedings, but for conformity she had indicated 79 In other words, the Council in the Marches of Wales. 85 Her case reinforces the point that coverture had to be invoked, not assumed.
During the early years of its development, Star Chamber was a court that attracted female litigants from across England and Wales, and in similar proportions to those in Chancery, a court considered advantageous for women. Yet less than a fifth of cases explicitly included female litigants, and this article has discussed the means by which the court both impinged upon and facilitated a woman's negotiating capacities. On the one hand, the court shared a flexibility toward married women's legal identities that was conducive to female litigants: in real property cases, there is an acceptance that a wife should be legally named as plaintiff in disputes involving her own inheritance or dower. More significantly, the court enabled wives to bring suits against their husbands where they had been excluded from those properties and 84 TNA, STAC 2/15/369. 85 TNA, STAC 2/15/368A.
28 the expected securities of married life. Nevertheless, the choice of litigant was dependent on a range of factors, linked to broad cultural expectations and legal practice. It is evident from Star Chamber documentation that more women were involved in disputes-either as victim or accessory-than are named as litigants, despite them having sufficient legal standing to be so. Wives (and female plaintiffs more generally) were unlikely to be named as litigants when they had been physically hurt either in lone attacks or part of a wider attack on a household. It is also the case that far fewer women came as defendants to Star Chamber, and its focus on corrupt officials and emphasis on physical force may well have played a part here. Given these structural constraints, the extent to which an individual woman's voice contributed to legal decisions is difficult to discern, and we cannot assume that where they were present, it was a product of their power. Widows may have felt pressured into pursuing their husbands' murderers, while daughters and wives were perhaps relieved that male relatives were the ones expected to take action against their attackers. Yet the narrative details afforded by Star
Chamber records do not suggest that female plaintiffs were passive and manipulated, or that it was considered unusual for them to be litigating: they were presented as active participants in the framing of the case, their opponents' responses, and in any procedural documentation.
For many, too, this was not their first or only attempt at pursuing justice, and the insights afforded by Star Chamber of their previous actions helps deepen our understanding of women's full and complex involvement in the multiple jurisdictions of early Tudor society.
